Interagency Coordination: Lessons Learned From the 2005 London Train Bombings
Editor's Note: This is the second in a two-part series on interagency coordination that examines the response to the 2005 London bombings.
In Issue 260 of the NIJ Journal , the authors identified promising practices in London's multiagency response. In this article, they discuss in more detail
the challenges faced by British agencies in responding to the attacks and lessons that may be learned from them.
In July 2005, terrorists carried out the first suicide attacks in modern Western Europe. At 8:50 a.m., bombs went off on three
London Underground trains. A fourth bomb was detonated a short time later on a double-decker bus. The attacks were the deadliest
in London since World War II, killing 52 people and injuring more than 700 others.
London agencies responding to the bombings faced a number of challenges, which were, in part, driven by the virtually simultaneous
nature of the attacks. Initial reports about the source of the explosions ranged from a train derailment to a body on the
tracks to a power surge in the London Underground system. Passengers fled from multiple station exits, causing further confusion about the number of attack sites.
As part of a National Institute of Justice-funded study, we interviewed officials directly involved in responding to the July
2005 bombings, including law enforcement, fire and medical services, and public health authorities. We found that although
protocols followed by the multiple agencies that responded to the attacks largely minimized major problems, communication,
leadership and legal difficulties did affect the coordination efforts.
The primary issues reported to us during our interviews related to communication and leadership.
One of the biggest challenges faced by the London agencies was how to communicate with the victims' families. Family members and friends found it difficult to get information on the status and location of injured or deceased loved
ones — so the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) set up a family assistance center on the day following the bombings.
Responders also encountered problems with radio communications. Although the radio systems used by the British Transport Police
and London Underground staff worked in the subway tunnels, the radios of other responding agencies, including MPS, did not.
The interoperability of radios — the ability of radio systems to work in all settings and across all agencies — is technically
a communications problem; however, leadership is crucial in developing and testing cross-agency systems prior to an emergency.
According to the authorities we interviewed, solutions to the radio interoperability problems were being worked on at the
time of the bombings; they had not, however, been fully implemented.
Failures in leadership can also contribute to coordination-related problems, especially when attacks occur in three different
police jurisdictions, as was the case with the London bombings. Shortly after the attacks, the City of London Police, which
is responsible for the Square Mile in the center of London, restricted cell phone network access to specific users to reduce
network traffic and improve first responder access. This had the unintended consequence, however, of cutting off access for
many responding agencies, including the London Ambulance Service. The London Ambulance Service was able to communicate using
alternate means, and no major harm resulted from the restriction. Nonetheless, this example underscores the need for planning
Legal issues further complicated the multiagency response. Concerns over privacy laws initially kept authorities from sharing
information with bombing survivors and their families. The United Kingdom's Data Protection Act prohibits sharing personal
data without the consent of those concerned, thus limiting what information officials could give agencies and families on
the identity and status of victims. American public health offices have raised similar concerns about our Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and how these regulations could affect communication and information sharing with
other agencies, including law enforcement.
Applying Lessons Learned
London officials learned valuable lessons regarding the multiagency response to the July 2005 bombings. We found that the
flexibility of London's protocols for interagency coordination helped minimize major problems in emergency coordination. London
officials had established relationships with one another and had practiced agreed-upon procedures. Consequently, a command
and control system was up and running quickly, there was limited confusion about agencies' roles and responsibilities, and
a unified message was delivered to the media.
According to British expert Peter Simpson, a participant in our study, the city continues to improve its procedures for interagency
command and control, communication and planning across agencies, and joint training.
British legislation, such as the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 and the Civil Contingencies Act, provide a foundation for
multiagency partnerships. The Crime and Disorder Act requires local agencies, including the police and public health authorities,
to work together to develop crime prevention strategies; the Civil Contingencies Act establishes clear roles and responsibilities
for agencies involved in emergency preparation and response. To further improve response, a review of the Civil Contingencies
Act currently under way will define a set of performance standards for local responders; create a performance management agreement,
which includes capturing and sharing performance data; and devise an intervention strategy for poorly performing organizations.
The experience in London offers important guidance to U.S. agencies. But before we attempt to apply any lessons learned to
the U.S., there are certain factors that should be considered. First, we must recognize the long history of disaster response
in which London's coordination approach is rooted. This includes extensive bombings of the city during World War II and the
Irish Republican Army's campaign of violence in the 1970s and 1980s. In both cases, incidents were too extensive to be addressed
by a single agency.
The size of a jurisdiction and the number and type of agencies within that jurisdiction are also critical. For example, the
U.K. has 43 local police agencies, compared to more than 17,000 in this country. Cross-agency responses in the United States
may also need to be coordinated at federal, state and local levels. The public safety and research communities must work together
to better understand how the characteristics of local jurisdictions affect response capacity and to identify and implement
protocols that contribute to successful coordination.
Based on our research and lessons learned from the multiagency response to the London bombings, we believe that the first
step in preparedness planning involves evaluating how well agencies coordinate with one another. To begin the evaluation,
we should develop baseline measures in every community. The measurements will help policymakers identify which communities
need to improve their coordination before a crisis occurs.
Terrorism — like the 2005 bombings in London — is a complex problem that requires multiagency solutions. Failure to communicate
among agencies and plan in advance can lead to an inferior response. Working together regularly can help agencies understand
each other's roles, sustaining long-term partnerships and improving future response to emergency situations.
NIJ Journal No. 261, October 2008
About the Authors
Kevin J. Strom is a senior scientist in RTI International's Crime, Violence, and Justice Research Program. He has 12 years of experience
in criminal justice research, including law enforcement responses to community violence and interagency coordination in response
Joe Eyerman is a senior research methodologist and director of the Health Security Program at RTI International. He has 17 years of experience
with quantitative and qualitative modeling and analysis of social behavior; his primary research interest is in the formal
and statistical modeling of decision processes related to individual and organizational political behavior, violence and terrorism.
Back to the top.
 U.K. Home Office, Addressing Lessons From the Emergency Response to the 7 July 2005 London Bombings (on Scribed.com) Exit Notice.
 See Strom, K.J., and J. Eyerman, "Interagency Coordination: A Case Study of the 2005 London Train Bombings," NIJ Journal 260 (July 2008): 8-11.
 U.K. Home Office, Addressing Lessons; London Regional Resilience Forum, Looking Back, Moving Forward. The Multi-Agency Debrief: Lessons Identified and Progress Since the Terrorist Events of 7 July
2005 (pdf, 62 pages) Exit Notice, London: Government Office for London, 2006.
 Eyerman, J., and K.J. Strom,A Cross-National Comparison of Interagency Coordination Between Law Enforcement and Public Health (pdf, 182 pages), final report submitted to the National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC: February 2006 (NCJ 212868).
 Strom, "Interagency Coordination."
Date Modified: June 27, 2011